Populism as a Threat to Democracy: Drawing Parallels of Populist Elements Between the Presidential Campaigns of Donald Trump (United States, 2016) and Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia, 2014 and 2019)

Annisa Pratamasari[1] and Fitra Shaumi Az-Zahra[2]

In the past few years, populism has been a topic frequently debated in the field of political science. The phenomenon is often cited as an indication of declining democracy in various regions of the world. Frequently cited cases of populism include Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 United States presidential election and the United Kingdom's dramatic vote to leave the European Union (Brexit). There have also been studies of populism in non-Western countries. Whilst such literature has revealed that each region may feature different forms of populism, this paper argues that there are also cross-regional similarities, particularly in terms of the strategies employed by populist candidates during presidential elections, albeit with different outcomes. This study therefore, aims to draw parallels between the populist elements in the campaigns conducted by two presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Prabowo Subianto, in their respective countries. In doing so, the authors attempt to analyze the domestic political settings in post-partum democracies and voter mobilization strategies in the two countries. The paper concludes by postulating the reasons why the two candidates scored different results in their respective election campaigns.

Keywords: Populism, Donald Trump, presidential elections, presidential campaign, Prabowo Subianto

---

[1] Annisa Pratamasari is a junior lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Airlangga University in Indonesia. She is currently enrolled in a PhD program majoring in international commerce at Korea University, Graduate School of International Studies. She has obtained her Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree at the Department of International Relations, Airlangga University and a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in international trade at the Chinese Culture University in Taipei. Her research interests include international political economy, culture trade, *Hallyu,* and the inter-Korean relationship. She can be contacted at annisa23@korea.ac.kr

[2] Fitra Shaumi Az-Zahra is currently a fresh graduate of the Department of International Relations, Airlangga University in Indonesia. Fitra takes concern in strategic culture, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the politics and identity of the Southeast Asian region. You can contact her at fitrasazzahra@gmail.com for any inquiries or other professional-related matter.

Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increase in the emergence of populist leaders around the globe. Thus, a subsequent rise in the volume of research on populism conducted within the field of international relations can also be seen. Donald Trump's shocking 2016 election win and Brexit are notable examples of the rise of populism within Western democracies. Other recently emerging populist figures include Marine Le Pen of France, who lost to Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French presidential election, Norbert Hofer, who almost won the Austrian presidency in 2016, and Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines.

As the wave of populism spreads across the world, the forms it takes and the issues arising from it vary from region to region. Populism in Europe, the United States, Southeast Asia, and even Africa has different forms and mechanisms, although sharing similar fundamental characteristics. Joshua Kurlantzick distinguished Southeast Asian populism from its Western counterparts based on the issues arising from it.[3] While Western populism highlights anti-free trade, anti-globalization, and anti-immigration issues, Southeast Asian (hereafter SEA) countries are inclined towards the polarization and division of society based on ethnic and religious lines. However, in both cases populism can be considered to stem from similar roots: the dissatisfaction and frustration of the lower- and middle-classes toward government policy on certain issues. These issues may also vary from drug-related issues (the Philippines) to deeply entrenched corruption and unsatisfactory income levels (Indonesia). Whatever form it takes, we argue that populism poses a threat to national unity and democracy. While claiming to enforce unity among like-minded people against a common enemy, such as the elites or foreigners, populism actually polarizes society and drives a wedge among its citizens. Populist elements are often more apparent in movements or campaigns which attract a large amount of attention, such as the Solidarity Movement in South Africa,[4] Eurosceptic campaigns in

---

[3] Joshua Kurlantzick, "Southeast Asia's Populism Is Different but Also Dangerous," Council on Foreign Relations, November 1, 2018, accessed December 26, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/article/southeast-asias-populism-different-also-dangerous.

[4] The Solidarity Movement refers to an organization in post-apartheid South Africa which seeks to defend the rights of white minorities. (See: Danelle van Zyl-Hermann, "Make Afrikaners great again! National populism, democracy and the new white minority politics in post-apartheid South Africa," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41, no.15 (2018): 2673).

the United Kingdom's Brexit referendum, and presidential campaigns and government policies in many countries around the world.

This paper explores the emergence and growing popularity of populist leaders in spite of accusations of counter-factualism and the manipulation of information. It also aims to explain why, despite applying similar strategies, popoulist candidates from different regions may see different outcomes in their respective election campaigns. Finally, it is argued that whether or not such campaigns are successful, the post-election popularity of populist figures has the potential to bring a decline to democracy in the region.

Upon this basis, the paper conducts a comparative study of populism in the U.S. during the 2016 presidential elections and Indonesia during the 2014 and 2019 presidential election campaigns. The case selection is based upon the unique similarities projected by the presidential candidates in these campaigns. Despite differences in the domestic political settings of the two countries, both share a similar experience of populism projected by the candidates in question, namely Donald Trump of the U.S. and Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia. We argue that when compared with that of other SEA populist leaders, Trump's strategy is most similar to that of Prabowo. Despite the similarities however, the two ended up with different results – with Trump winning the election and Prabowo suffering defeat in the 2014 elections and expecting a rematch with the incumbent candidate, Joko Widodo, in 2019.

As stated above, this paper attempts to draw parallels between the populist-inclined campaigns conducted by the two presidential candidates. To highlight both the similarities and differences in the presidential campaigns, we will first analyze the domestic political settings and voter mobilization strategies in the two countries. Lastly, we conclude the paper by postulating the reasons why the two candidates scored different results in their respective elections.

Literature Review

Despite its popularity in recent studies, the definitions and categorizations of populism remain varied across the literature.[5] Some literature suggests that populism should be perceived as a strategy rather

---

[5] Paul D. Kenny. *Populism in Southeast Asia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

than a concept or an ideology. These arguments predominantly originate from socio-political scholars and journalists who view populism as a political strategy projected by opposition parties, using the media as leverage to gain power.[6] Most of these scholars posit that the strategy includes promising the redistribution of wealth that elites have failed to effectuate during their terms in office.[7]

On the other hand, scholars from historical, economic, and political backgrounds suggest that populism can be better defined as a phenomenon. This is also the definition adopted by this paper in examining the implications of this phenomenon for the strategies adopted by populist leaders and addressing the increasing momentum of populism as a means to attract potential voters. In other words, this definition considers the phenomenon of post-democracy or post-partum democracy to be the outcome of undemocratic tendencies and non-genuine democratic approaches adopted by populist leaders in their political campaigns prior to election.

According to Francis Fukuyama, the global rise of populism has been caused in part by a decline in the spread of democracy coupled with an increase in steps counter to globalization.[8] He further illustrates three characteristics of populism: first, populist leaders tend to campaign for policies that while popular in the short run, are unsustainable in the long run. For instance, the 45th President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez' massive subsidies for the poor failed after a slump in oil prices sharply hit government income. Second, populist leaders deploy 'us against them' rhetoric, identifying themselves only with certain ethnic or religious groups whilst exluding the rest, as the basis of their legitimacy. Third, populism has significant linkages with charismatic leadership, to the

---

[6] Some of the various articles written by scholars and researchers that define populism as a strategy can be seen in the following articles: Demetrios G. Papdemetriou, Kate Hooper, and Meghan Benton, "In Search of a New Equilibrium: Immigration Policymaking in the Newest Era of Nativist Populism," Transatlantic Council on Migration, November 2018, accessed January 6, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/.../TCM-NativistPopulism_Final.pdf; Cox did not clearly define it as a strategy, but agrees that it could be defined as a strategy to some extent (Michael Cox, "Understanding the Global Rise of Populism," LSE Ideas, February 2018, accessed December 26, 2018, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Understanding-Global-Rise-of-Populism.pdf; and Moises Naim, "How to Be a Populist," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 21, 2017, accessed January 1, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/21/how-to-be-populist-pub-68751.

[7] Naim, "How to Be a Populist."

[8] Francis Fukuyama, "The Rise of Populist Nationalism," Credit Suisse, January 23, 2018, accessed February 1, 2018, https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-and-expertise/francis-fukuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801.html.

extent that populist leaders may develop a personality cult in order to establish direct relatability with voters. Though populist campaigns may not contain all such elements, they tend to display at least one of the characteristics described above.

Michael Cox asserts that populism is a phenomenon in which there are certain individuals or political parties standing juxtaposed to the government with a promise to represent 'the will of the people'.[9] In addition, Wahyu Prasetyawan posited that populism has three core characteristics, namely anti-elite rhetoric, a charismatic leader, and the establishment of a relatable linkage with the unorganized masses.[10] Populism has also been linked with anti-elite, anti-establishment, anti-pluralism, anti-immigrantion, and anti-minority rhetoric. However, these characteristics can be considered as 'shallow' characteristics of populism, as they are predominantly employed in identifying populism and populist leaders. Other research streams, however, criticize such narrow indicators, cautioning that populism should not be confused with mere xenophobia or anti-immigrantion sentiments.[11]

The populist phenomenon exists as a consequence of perceived powerlessness and a sense of injustice felt by wide sectors of society. Triggered by both political and economic insecurities, the recent financial and economic crises in Europe, for instance, have been a breeding ground for populism.[12] Some scholars posit that hyper globalization, the inevitable and rapid growth of commercial integration, and complex interactions between state and non-state actors, has caused a global power shift and a subsequent sense of powerlessness in the West, both among ordinary citizens as well as leaders and politicans.[13] Arvind Subramanian notes, however, that hyper globalization has also generated enormous wealth and alleviated poverty in developing

---

[9] Cox, "Understanding the Global Rise of Populism."

[10] Wahyu Prasetyawan, "Populism or Identity Politics: Explaining Electoral Politics in Indonesia," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, November 2017, accessed December 10, 2018, https://kyotoreview.org/yav/populism-identity-electoral-politics-indonesia/.

[11] Massimo Vittorio, "Can Populism Be an Ally of Democracy?" *Online International Journal of Philosophy* XII, no. 24 (2017): 130, doi: 10.7413/18281567116; and Bart Bonikowski, "Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United States," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2016): 9.

[12] Emmanuel Mavrozacharakis, "Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship," *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, October 23, 2018, accessed February 1, 2019, https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/Home/eqpam_vol7no4-oct2018-_mavrozacharakis.

[13] Cox, "Understanding the Global Rise of Populism."

countries. [14] However, there are arguments that the benefits of globalization are not evident in the West; rather, it has caused a 'domestic complex' in which wealth is concentrated in the hands of a minority, middle-class income has become stagnant, and poverty is increasing among the lower and middle-classes.

Powerlessness, as posited by Massimo Vittorio, is one of many possible causes of apathy, alienation, and disillusionment toward politics, resulting in non-participation in the democratic process. Although only a part of the larger cause, such traits have become crucial in addressing cases of populism. Political apathy indicates the ongoing disengagement of certain individuals or groups from domestic politcs. Some forms of apathy are the consequence of alienation under certain establishments: most governments formulate their policies to satisfy the interests of majority groups, leaving those with opposing interests sidelined. Although some leaders do not intend to alienate certain groups and try to accommodate them under their policies, a country's political system can influence the extent to which they are able to do so. As apathy, alienation, and disillusionment spread, it is easier for candidates to attract voters, so long as the candidates remain approachable and relatable to these people and convey messages that address their concerns. In other cases, alienation could be understood in the sense that "men pursue goals and use means in their pursuit, determined either by social entities with which they do not feel intimately identified or by forces, which they may be unable to recognize at all". [15]

Bart Bonikowski posited that populism can indeed be employed as a political strategy and molded to suit any political setting and narrative in order to appeal to the masses. [16] It is not imperative for candidates to embrace it as an ideology, rather it is a strategic narrative constructed to appeal to 'the people.' Populism claims that it represents the interests of certain members of the population, while democracy has a more inclusive claim to representativeness: *from the people, to the people, and by the people*. However, participation in democracy arguably does not cater to the whole population. It has always been limited to

---

[14] Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler, "The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future," Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series 13-6, July 2013: 8, accessed February 1, 2019, https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/wp/wp13-6.pdf.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Bonikowski, "Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United States," 12.

certain sectors of the population and democratic power relies heavily on 'the will of the people', the mirror of which can be seen in the principle of populism. Hence, as contended by Emmanuel Mavrozacharakis, populism can easily be manifested under democratic pretensions[17] and spread in countries adhering to democratic principles, such as Indonesia and the U.S.

Delineating Populism: Post-Partum Democracy and the Emergence of Populist Leaders and Their Strategies

The United States

The political setting in the U.S. is underlined by the major division of society into two distinct political associations: the left-wing and the right-wing. Right-wing parties are often associated with their strong views in favour of maintaining traditional values, while left-wing parties tend to be associated with policies in favour of social equality and egalitarianism, opposing the traditional social heirarchies. Although there are some specific classifications within each political wing, such as the 'alternative-right' 'far,' or 'center,' the most significant delineation with regards to American elections is that of the two major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. Known for its deeply entrenched two-party system, the only time in which these two major parties have been challenged was in the 1860's when The People's Party rose to political prominence. The People's Party can also be categorized as a populist party, as it fought to accommodate the will of the American people—referring predominantly to middle- and lower-class citizens striving to recover from the economic crisis caused by the Civil War.[18]

Left-wing political groups show greater concern for tackling issues relating to social inequality and egalitarianism, whereas right-wing parties place greater importance on upholding the social order that they perceive as the best way to govern a country consisting of various economic classes and traditions. Examples of presidents supported by left-wing parties include Barack Obama, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson, while George Bush Senior and Junior, and current

---

[17] Mavrozacharakis, "Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship."
[18] Khan Academy. "The Populist," accessed January 3, 2019, https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/the-gilded-age/gilded-age/a/the-populists.

president Donald J. Trump are among those who have been backed by right-wing parties. This classification defines a party's, and therefore candidate's standpoint, hence, there are clear differences in their political stances and the demographics of the population that will be inclined to vote for them.[19]

What differentiates the American political system from that of other countries, even when compared with Western counterparts such as Canada or the European states, is the complexity of the electoral voting system whereby the popular vote cannot determine a presidential candidate's success.[20] Instead, the candidate must win the 50 states' electoral votes which require them to construct a campaign strategy broad enough to reach them all. Consequently, voters are required to understand the political dynamics within their own state, including who their electors are and what party they come from. Citizens do not vote directly for their president, but rather for the electors who represent their votes in the presidential elections.[21]

At this point, we can conclude that the U.S. electoral system makes it difficult for voters to directly give 'winning points' without fully understanding the impact their votes will have within their own state. The process of choosing electors, senates, and representatives determines which party would take over a state, impacting voters' daily lives, and determining the success of presidential candidates. In other words, such an electoral system should not be easily influenced by populism since voters must first choose the electors, who will have the most direct impact on their daily lives.

Despite being structured in such a way as to limit populist influences, voters' lack of understanding of the election process has been a contributing factor in the emergence of populism in the U.S. The electoral system requires voters to follow closely the specific dynamics of domestic politics since electors, senates, and representatives all play important roles in determining policies that will affect them.

---

[19] Jahn Detlef, Nils Dupont, and Martin Rachuj, "Left-Right Party Ideologies in 36 Countries," Greifswald Comparative Politics Working Paper 11: 23, January 2018, accessed January 3, 2019, http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/gcp/GCP-11-2018.pdf.

[20] Andrew Chang, "U.S. Election System vs. Rest of World," ABC News, accessed February 10, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82153&page=1.

[21] Jason Brennan, "Opinion: The Electoral College is anti-democratic - and that's a good thing," Market Watch, November 8, 2016, accessed February 5, 2019, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-electoral-college-is-anti-democraticand-thats-a-good-thing-2016-09-12.

Consequently, American voters are influenced by the emergence of a 'charismatic leader' to a significantly lower extent than voters in SEA countries may be. The dual party system also encourages citizens to be more active within domestic politics and in excercising their right to vote by making it easier for parties to embody their target demographics and making voters' choice simpler as a consequence.

Despite its unique and complex political system, Trump's victory in 2016 highlights similarities between the populist experiences of the U.S. and those of other Western countries. In all such experiences, populist candidates emerged from the far ends of the political spectrum (in Trump's case from the right), where degrees of political alignment contradicted the practice of genuine democracy and liberal thinking. Thus, the complexity of the system becomes insignificant as voter's dissatisfaction toward the current order persist, and as new candidates are able to gain support and exposure by promising to change the status quo.

From this examination, it is clear that the U.S. political structure was designed to be 'populist-proof,' through a rigorous system of checks and balances. Donald Trump's strategies however, were able to overcome such systematic restrictions resulting in his success in the 2016 presidential elections.

Indonesia

As illustrated above, the U.S. possesses a unique domestic political setting, differing greatly from that of SEA countries, specifically Indonesia. As suggested by Edward Aspinall and Marcus Meitzner, SEA countries are prone to populism due to the failure of both clientistic and bureaucratic parties in embodying the needs of citizens.[22] Kurlantzick also highlighted the factors behind populism in SEA.[23] While Western populism stresses anti-free trade and anti-immigration issues, SEA countries are inclined toward the polarization and division of society along ethnic and religious lines. Moreover, populism in SEA countries is believed to have occurred through internal, push factors such as the failure of clientistic and beuraucratic parties to spread their ideology and values, and to reach out to members of society, rather than through

---

[22] Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50, no. 3 (2014): 355.
[23] Kurlantzick, "Southeast Asia's Populism Is Different but Also Dangerous."

external factors. This results in randomized and self-interested voting behavior in presidential elections. Due to the low party attachement levels among general society, and the fragmented nature of clientelist political parties,[24] opportunities arise for populist figures to gain prominence and establish direct connections with the voters.[25] This is evidenced by the rise of populist figures like Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, who built their own political parties to establish a direct connection with the voters.

Indonesia shares similar political settings with other SEA countries, albeit still displaying unique traits. As a newly independent country, during the Old Order era[26] balancing power between political parties was no easy task.[27] Hence, Sukarno, as the most prominent political figure of the time, played a leading role in setting the agenda for domestic politics. Subsequently, Suharto with the New Order created his own political machine, *Golongan Karya* (the Golkar Party), to win people's votes. Under his authoritarian regime, the multi-party system remained, but Golkar was overwhelmingly dominant in the domestic political scene for three decades. Nonetheless, the presidential election system in Indonesia during this period was similar to that of the U.S. in

---

[24] Further research on low attachment to any political parties, see: R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party, and Religion, Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 7 (2007): 838; and Muhtadi in Kenny, Populism in Southeast Asia.

[25] Kenny, Populism in Southeast Asia, 18.

[26] The term 'New Order' was coined by Indonesian President Suharto to characterize his regime upon coming to power in 1966. The term was intended to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, which he dubbed as the 'Old Order.' The falling of Sukarno's regime arguably started when he declared 'Guided Democracy' (Demokrasi Terpimpin) as the main principle of Indonesia in the 1950s. Such moves made the West label Sukarno as a 'dictator', which worsened the relationship with the Western countries, particularly with the U.S. Despite initiating the Non-Alignment Movements among the Third World countries at that time, during this period, Sukarno was seen to lean towards the Eastern Bloc and domestically set the political landscape in Indonesia to be centered around three parties with their respective ideologies: Nationalism (PNI), Religion (Masyumi), and Communist (PKI). His policy made domestic politics more fragmented and increasingly unstable. The final closure of the Old Order happened when the PKI conducted a coup d'etat in 1965 by kidnapping and assassinating some Indonesian Army Generals (G30S PKI), and Suharto was assigned by Sukarno to resolve it. Then, a decree to transfer executive power from Sukarno to Suharto was signed by Sukarno. Hence, the New Order tried to contrast itself from Sukarno's era by eradicating and distancing itself from communism and the Eastern bloc, then by re-establishing the severed ties and building a closer relationship with the West.

[27] The Indonesian political system has always been characterized by multi-party systems. Even though there were some dominant parties over the years, it did not make other smaller parties insignificant. During Old Order, some notable parties were the National Party of Indonesia (PNI), Masyumi, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which were declared as NASAKOM, or the core parties by Sukarno. During the New Order, there had always been three parties running for elections: GOLKAR by Suharto, Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI – nationalist front), and the United Development Party (PPP – Islam-based party).

terms of its indirect elections, though Indonesia had a less complex system without electoral votes. The president was not directly elected by the people, but through the legislative branch, which was elected by the people. This system was revised in 2004 when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) won the presidency by capitalizing on his personal appeal and claiming to stand for the 'other' and the 'non-elites,' thus differentiating himself from his rival, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno's daughter.[28]

The fall of the New Order era in 1998 brought about changes to the Indonesian political scene.[29] It ended three decades of authoritarian rule and opened up new opportunities for political movements and varied ideologies to flourish. As posited above, there was an increased scope for prominent leaders to appeal to the masses and build attachements between themselves and potential voters. Hence, the political setting in Indonesia during the post-Suharto period provided increased opportunities for populist elements to be incorporated into campaign narratives. The role of prominant figures is further illustrated by declining levels of public trust towards Indonesian political parties.[30] Within the legislative branch, the parties share of seats has been increasingly dispersed so that even PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) and PD (Democratic Party), the election winners in 2004, 2009, and 2014, held less than a 20% share of seats in parliament.[31] Despite voter turnout in the 2014 elections reaching 65% it remained lower than the turnout for the presidential elections in both 2004 (78%) and 2009 (82%).[32]

Based on several studies,[33] the end of the New Order also opened up a new era of identity-based politics, both in terms of ethnic

---

[28] Dagg in Kenny, Populism in Southeast Asia, 51.

[29] Sandra Hamid, "Jokowi's Party Takes Lead in Indonesia's Elections, But Steep Road Ahead," The Asia Foundation, April 9, 2014, accessed February 1, 2019, https://asiafoundation.org/2014/04/09/jokowis-party-takes-lead-in-indonesias-elections-but-steep-road-ahead/.

[30] Andrew Thornley, "Nine Takeaways from the Legislative Elections," The Asia Foundation, April 16, 2014, accessed February 1, 2019, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IndonesiaElections.pdf.

[31] Hamid, "Jokowi's Party Takes Lead in Indonesia's Elections, But Steep Road Ahead."

[32] Election Guide, "Republic of Indonesia," accessed February 1, 2019, http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/102/.

[33] Prasetyawan, "Populism or Identity Politics: Explaining Electoral Politics in Indonesia," and Marcus Mietzner, "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia," East-West Center, 2015, accessed February 1, 2019, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps072.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35018.

and religious identity. Ethnic-based belligerent movements, such as *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) and *Papua Merdeka* (OPM),[34] were harshly oppressed during the Suharto era, but they appeared on the political surface after the reformation. Moreover, after years of suppression under authoritatian rule, Islamic identity has also been increasingly embraced by the citizens of the country with the largest Muslim population in the world.[35] One reason why Islamic-based populism flourishes in Indonesia is because other forms of political thought, such as socialism and Marxism, were banned during the New Order era.[36] However, this newly embraced identity has generated increasing trends of intolerance and the politicization of religion within Indonesian politics.

Therefore, unlike the U.S., such of movements cannot be developed in Indonesia. On the other hand, Islamic-based populism (or Islamic politicization) has expanded onto the larger political stage and was especially notable during the regional election of the Jakarta governor in 2017, during which Basuki Tjahja Purnama,[37] as the incumbent candidate, was accused of religious blasphemy. His rival candidate, Anies Baswedan, later won the election by riding the wave of mass-mobilization led by Islamic hardliner organizations, FPI (Islamic Defender's Front) and GNPF-MUI (National Fatwa Guard Movement of the Council of Indonesian Ulema), which voiced their protests against this alleged blasphemy. The mobilization constructed their objectives as 'defending Islam and the interests of Muslims,' and was deemed a

---

[34] GAM and OPM are both ethnic-based belligerent movements from Aceh and Papua, respectively, which sought independence from Indonesia. To simplify, both movements are derived from the people's dissatisfaction and perceived unjust treatment by the central government toward the local people. It also stemmed from the inequal distribution of wealth for the locals and for the Javanese, who dominated the government as the dominant ethnicity. However, rather than populism-based movement, these organizations are more aptly categorized as belligerents due to their separatist tendencies. Suharto was known to harshly oppress such movements using military forces. Hence, after the fall of his regime, these organizations re-emerged and demanded independence more strongly.

[35] Greta Nabbs-Keller, "Indonesia: populism and politicisation of Islam," *The Interpreter*, October 26, 2018, accessed December 27, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-populism-and-politicisation-islam.

[36] Abubakar EbyHara, "Populism in Indonesia and its Threats to Democracy," Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017), January 2018, doi: 10.2991/icsps-17.2018.23.

[37] He was the representative of double-minorities in Indonesia: Chinese and Christian, while Anies represented the majority of the Indonesian Muslims. The support from the FPI (Islamic Defender's Front) and the GNPF-MUI (National Fatwa Guard Movement of the Council of Indonesian Ulema) was not secretive during the election campaign and they were backed by political parties like the PKS (Justice and Prosperity Party) and Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement Party).

political strategy of opposition parties such as Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement Party), PAN (the National Mandate Party), and PKS (Justice and Prosperity Party), and was supported by prominant Islamic organizations.[38] Such a mobilization strategy is expected to be re-used in the upcoming 2019 elections.

Force Mobilization Strategy

The consequences of emerging feelings of apathy, alienation, and powerlessness among certain groups of the population can be seen in two common scenarios: either voters become apathetic and do not use their votes at all, or they try to find candidates who are not associated with the major parties and voice their displeasure with the status quo in hopes of receiving support from such groups of the population. In this case, it is reasonable to conclude that populist leaders identify feelings of powerlessness or desperation among the population, and harness them to their advantage through campaigns and rallies. Previous studies have suggested that successful populist leaders are those with the most appealing strategy to a large group of people. They often ensure that they have sufficient exposure among their target demographics and claim that they are one of the people and so will listen, share, and relate to these people's sentiments. Furthermore, these candidates also take efforts to align themselves with certain interest groups, who tend to have bold stances and oppose the status quo. For instance, populist campaigns in Europe focussed heavily on immigration issues, which have been a source of dissent within the societies. Other examples include the economic arguments of pro-Brexit campaigners who highlighted Britain's perceived losses under liberal trade policies.

Emmanuel Mavrozachakaris further indicates that populist leaders often adhere to democratic pretensions, rarely declaring openly that they are undemocratic. Hence, he posits that populism is the continuation of dictatorship by democratic means.[39] Moises Naim also highlights that populist leaders and the groups that support them tend to use the media to reach out to voters who have apathetic tendencies as

---

[38] Asmiati Malik and Scott Edwards, "From 212 to 812: Copy and Paste Populism in Indonesia and Malaysia?" *The Diplomat*, December 18, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/from-212-to-812-copy-and-paste-populism-in-indonesia-and-malaysia/.

[39] Mavrozacharakis, "Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship."

leverage to gain power.[40] Through the media, populist leaders can deliver messages filled with anti-immigration sentiments and 'us versus them' rhetoric based upon fabricated information.[41] Populist narratives therefore, focus igniting the emotions of voters rather than delivering accurate and reliable information.

This becomes problematic, as with globalization and the swift advancement of technology, information can be easily obtained and manipulated in the modern era. Mavrozachakaris points out that in most regions, the campaign strategies of electoral candidates' falls into one of two different categories. While some candidates may be considered 'genuinely democratic' others are considered 'populist democratic.' The first category focuses on the openness of information whereby candidates provide credible data and facts to gain legitimacy, while the latter category masters the art of using media to mask reality and justify one's opinions. Democratic language is usually linked to the accountability of the government, governance, and information delivered under a democratic regime. Populist language however, lies at the opposite end of the spectrum, relying on igniting people's fears, and evoking an emotional response, with disregard for actual facts and evidence. Mavrozachakaris cites the U.S. 2016 election and Brexit as examples of the most flagrant fact-distorting campaigns that were nonetheless successful. For instance, Trump denounced global warming as a myth despite scientific evidence to the contrary. In the case of Brexit, the 'leave' campaign was successful despite numerous studies warning of the economic consequences Britain would face if it were to leave the European Union.

United States

As had been the case with other populist leaders, Trump used simple and inflamatory language in order to make himself appealing to the average citizen and evoke emotional responses from those who do not go out of their way to fact-check the information they are presented with. Susan Hunston has examined Trump's strategy by comparing the language used with that of all U.S. presidential candidates between 2000 and 2017. The

---

[40] Naim, "How to Be a Populist."
[41] Daase and Deitelhoff in Mavrozacharakis, "Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship."

study revealed that Trump's language was the most unelaborated, yet the most understandable to a high percentage of the population.[42] In other words, his language implicitly aimed to align him with non-politicians in order to assert his identity as a 'common man.' Trump's linguistic constructions were simple, with shorter words, and employing a limited and restricted vocabulary.[43] He wanted to convey that his speeches were the outspoken opinions of the 'common man' rather than the well-worded, tactically written scripts of a politician, the language of casual, unguarded talk, private language used in a public arena, indicating a claim to his identity as a populist.[44]

Trump's populist strategies also included propaganda, one of the most common and long-standing political strategies, in the form of the willful misrepresentation and manipulation of information, which was distributed as widely as possible. Compared with Hillary Clinton, Trump did not have much media support, but he was known to have a very distinctive 'propaganda' strategy. Cory Wimberly explains that the power of propaganda traditionally lies in the hands of a professional propagandist, and the key for its utilization lies in the relationship between the elites and the media. Trump's propaganda however, has exceeded these factors.[45] Many of his goals have been achieved without the help of the mainstream media and their resources. This was arguably achieveable due to his successful self-branding and ability to utilize social media, especially Twitter, as a tool for campaigning.[46]

One of the most controversial sources of his fame, popularity, and legitimacy was his tweets. For instance, through tweets, he labeled unfavorable media reports about his administration and policies as fake

---

[42] Susan Hunston, "Donald Trump and the language of populism," *University of Birmingham*, September 2017, accessed January 1, 2019,
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/donald-trump-language-of-populism.aspx.
[43] Liz Hendriks, "Trump's logic: Rhetoric in the 2016 US elections," *Bachelor thesis*, Tilburg University, 2018, 24, accessed February 24, 2019, http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=146214; Jared Quigley, "An Unlikely Populist: Donald Trump and the Rhetoric of Elite and Minority Resentment," *Honors Scholar Theses*, University of Connecticut, 2018, 6, accessed February 1, 2019, https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1586?context=srhonors_theses; Joel Pearce, "A Politics of the People: Comparing the Use of Populist Discourse in the 2016 US Presidential Election," *Undergraduate Political Review* 1 (2018): 28, doi: 10.21953/lse.nqq3eycr36ij.
[44] Hunston, "Donald Trump and the language of populism."
[45] Cory Wimberly, "Trump, Propaganda, and the Politics of Ressentiment," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 32, no. 1 (2018): 183, doi: 10.5325/jspecphil.32.1.0179.
[46] Prashanth Bhat, "Populism's Global Media Strategy," *Fair Observer*, January 19, 2017, accessed January 7, 2019, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/populism-media-donald-trump-culture-news-63421/.

news. His controversial tweets received significant attention and were frequently retweeted, resulting in high levels of debate within both American society and the wider international community. This placed him under the spotlight, allowing him to be heard, and to spread his messages nationwide. His controversial tweets, one of which labeled the free press and several U.S. media outlets as "the enemy of the people," had been noted by journalists, media activists, and NGOs as a threat to journalistic freedom and freedom of speech. [47] Thus, such action threatens to bring a decline to the democratic system.

Indonesia

Similarly to the U.S., in Indonesia's case, such force mobilization strategies have resurfaced onto the national political scene in the post New Order period and were particularly evident during local elections in Jakarta. The case of Ahok signaled the rise of *ummah* populism (a form of Islamic populism), and the introduction of hate-spin as a strategy combining hate speech directed toward certain groups and manufactured offense taking through the performance of righteous indignation.[48] The rhetoric, as is common in populist campaigns, was "us versus them," creating divisions between native Indonesians (or *pribumi*) and citizens of Chinese descent, and between Muslims (*ummah*) and non-Muslims. In the case of the campaign opposing Ahok, this message successfully resonated with the masses, as Ahok was considered to be a member of the elites who had colluded with China in order to rule Jakarta and marginalize the majority of the population. Campaigns and mass-mobilization movements focusing on Ahok's ethnicity and religion therefore overshadowed the success of his policies during his administration, and distorted the election focus away from the programs of both candidates.[49]

---

[47] Cass Sunstein, "Now on Trump's hit list: freedom of speech," *Timesunion*, August 29, 2018, accessed January 8, 2019, https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Now-on-Trump-s-hit-list-freedom-of-speech-13192523.php.

[48] Ummah populism refers to a form of populism coined by Hadiz in which the concept of 'ummah' (a community of believers) substitutes the concept of 'the people.' (See: Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Nationalism and Islamic Populism in Indonesia," Heinrich Boll Stiftung Southeast Asia, May 16, 2018, accessed December 15, 2018, https://th.boell.org/en/2018/05/16/nationalism-and-islamic-populism-indonesia.)

[49] The influences of ethnic and religious issues on voting behavior were reflected in a study by Gani. The study showed that the candidate pair Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno obtained larger shares of votes in the districts which were occupied by a majority of Muslims, while Ahok gained less

Meanwhile, as the main case of this paper, Prabowo followed the orthodox textbook of populism. He has always described himself as anti-elite and anti-MNCs (multinational corporations), rallying against corruption, and campaigning for economic nationalism and the protection of national resources from MNCs in his campaigns. Despite being a former military general and the son-in-law of Suharto, the second president of Indonesia, Prabowo portrayed himself as a 'maverick' from outside of elite circles and as someone who would save Indonesia from its declining democracy.[50] Nevertheless, he allegedly claimed that Indonesia is not ready for democracy and required the leadership of a benign authoritarian regime.[51] His campaigns, both in 2014 and 2019, have relied heavily on inciting anger and emotional responses from the masses while highlighting negative aspects of the ruling administration to win votes. This campaign strategy is aligned with one of the aforementioned characteristics of populist leaders; using 'anger' to provoke a sense of powerlessness and rouse the emotions of potential voters, particularly those from the middle-classes, who are considered to be 'losing out.'

Similar to Trump's campaign slogan, in 2019, Prabowo 'coined' the phrase "Make Indonesia Great Again" and stressed the importance of creating domestic jobs.[52] The slogan received criticism in Indonesia, as some experts accused him of racism and of plagiarizing Trump's campaign. However, the accusations were rebuffed by his campaign team who claimed that they merely borrowed the slogan to show patriotism, without elucidating any racist messages. In his campaigns, Prabowo stated, "Why is there no Indonesian who valiantly declared 'Indonesia First, Make Indonesia Great Again'? Why are there no leaders

---

votes in such areas (as cited in Arya Fernandes, "Politik Identitas dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi dan Efektivitas," *CSIS Election Series* 1 (2018): 2.

[50] Mietzner, "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia."

[51] This statement was claimed by Prabowo in an online interview with a freelance journalist in 2001. Based on the journalist's account, Prabowo stated that Indonesia is not ready for democracy as there are still people behaving like mobs and preferred benign authoritarian regime instead. ("US Journo's 2001 'Off the Record' Prabowo Interview Details Indonesia 'Not Ready for Democracy,'" *Jakarta Globe*, June 26, 2014, accessed January 2, 2019, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/us-journos-2001-record-prabowo-interview-details-indonesia-ready-democracy/. However, since the interview was off the record, Prabowo supporters denied it ever happening and there was no other proof besides the journalist's account.

[52] Lalu Rahadian, "Retorika Prabowo, Slogan Kampanye Trump, dan Tuduhan Rasisme," *Tirto Indonesia*, October 12, 2018, accessed December 30, 2018, https://tirto.id/retorika-prabowo-slogan-kampanye-trump-dan-tuduhan-rasisme-c6tt.

who dare to say so?"[53] During the same speech, he criticized the non-existent spillover effects of the liberal world order, promised under neoliberalism. He also advised against hating foreign countries yet emphasized the importance of Indonesia standing on its own feet. Much like Trump's anti-trade policy, he also declared he would not import anything from foreign countries.

Usage of Social Media

Regarding social media, Prabowo and his supporters also utilized this platform to attack his opponents. For example, the #2019GantiPresiden (#2019ChangethePresident) hashtag went viral on various social media outlets and elicited heated debates within the society. In 2018, before the campaign period officially started, an Islamist-populist rally, organized by the FPI was conducted. The FPI claimed that the rally was the reunion of the 212 movement,[54] and declared that electing Jokowi[55] is *haram* (forbidden) because he is supported by the PDIP (Democratic Party of Struggle), which also supported Ahok.[56]

Moreover, the hashtag #2019GantiPresiden, which was used as a slogan during the reunion of the 212 movement, has been shared widely

---

[53] Putu Merta Surya Putra, "Gaya kampanye contek Trump, Prabowo diingatkan soal retorika anti asing," *Merdeka*, October 12, 2018, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.merdeka.com/politik/gaya-kampanye-contek-trump-prabowo-diingatkan-soal-retorika-anti-asing.html.

[54] The '212 movement' refers to a mass demonstration held in Jakarta on December 2, 2016 which emerged from Islamic opposition to Ahok, a candidate running for the position of Governor of the capital city. The movement aimed to defend Islam, as Ahok had allegedly blasphemed the religion during one of his campaign activities. During the activity, he told one of the attendances not to believe the people who told lies using Qur'an verses. This movement later managed to influence the election results where Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno gained more votes in Muslim-populated areas, while Ahok gained less (Fernandes, "Politik Identitas dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi dan Efektivitas," 4).

[55] Joko Widodo (or popularly known as Jokowi) displayed a relatable figure for the common people and campaigned for populist policies like free health care and free education, which benefit the lower- to middle-class people. Some studies labeled him as a 'technocratic populist' because Jokowi never explicitly attacked the well-established elites, despite aiming for bureaucratic reforms, portraying a relatable image, and having a humble background to reach out to potential voters. He is the current President of Indonesia and will run in the 2019 election as an incumbent candidate against Prabowo.

[56] Malik and Scott, "From 212 to 812: Copy and Paste Populism in Indonesia and Malaysia?" Habieb Rizieq as FPI's leader denied his support for Prabowo's candidacy on April 2018, citing that he merely wished for the national unity for Indonesia and to protect the Muslims' way of life. However, he retracted his statement on September 2018 and openly declared his support for Prabowo's candidacy after the candidate pair signed an integrity pact (Raka Dwi Novianto, "Habib Rizieq Dukung Setelah Prabowo-Sandi Teken Pakta Integritas," *Nasional Sindo News*, September 16, 2018, accessed January 3, 2019, https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1338617/12/habib-rizieq-dukung-setelah-prabowo-sandi-teken-pakta-integritas-1537076942.

on social media and was even supported by Indonesian public figures and politicians. However, the biggest benefactor of this 'movement,' Neno Warisman, denied that it constitutes a political campaign, claiming that it is merely an expression of people's aspirations, "just like those people who express that they want the current president to be re-elected."[57] This movement was eventually banned by the Indonesian police and Election Supervisory Board (*Bawaslu – Bandan Pengawas Pemilu*).

The police stated that this movement threatens national unity,[58] as it is at times heavily influenced by racial, ethnic, and religious sentiments.[59] It was further accused of disturbing the social order and causing social anxiety, as reports of harassment and intimidation were filed by those who refused to participate in the movement.[60] The Bawaslu banned it on the grounds that it violated election laws, and had occurred even before the start of the official campaign period.[61] Consequently, the Bawaslu acknowledged the susceptibility of election campaigns to issues of an ethinc, religious, and racial nature. Following the ban, Habib Rizieq suggested a replacement hashtag: '#2019PrabowoPresiden' (#2019PrabowoForPresident). Even though it was initially intended as an official campaign platform, and the Bawaslu stated that all social media campaigns will be supervised as such, it has become a platform for the candidate's supporters to spread populist messages. Moreover, with a growing importance placed on the youth

---

[57] Bimo Wiwoho, "Deklarasi #2019GantiPresiden Diklaim Bukan Gerakan Politik," *CNN Indonesia*, May 3, 2018, accessed January 5, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180503182913-20-295516/deklarasi-2019gantipresiden-diklaim-bukan-gerakan-politik.

[58] Martahan Sohuturon, "Polri: Deklarasi #2019GantiPresiden Ancam Persatuan Bangsa," *CNN Indonesia*, August 27, 2018, accessed January 5, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180827134942-20-325193/polri-deklarasi-2019gantipresiden-ancam-persatuan-bangsa.

[59] Despite claiming to be 'neutral,' there are eyewitnesses that the participators of the movement frequently used Islamic attributes and yelled Islamic words like 'Allahu Akbar.' (Arif Huluwan Muzayyin, "Dugaan Intimidasi Massa #2019GantiPresiden Dicap Warisan Orba," *CNN Indonesia*, April 30, 2018, accessed January 5, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180430092357-20-294591/dugaan-intimidasi-massa-2019gantipresiden-dicap-warisan-orba.)

[60] Ronald, "Polisi Periksa Korban Dugaan Intimidasi Kelompok 2019 Ganti Presiden," *Liputan 6*, May 7, 2018, accessed January 5, 2019, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3504999/polisi-periksa-korban-dugaan-intimidasi-kelompok-2019-ganti-presiden.

[61] Parastiti Kharisma Putri, "Gerakan #2019GantiPresiden Melanggar? Ini Penjelasan Bawaslu," *Detik News*, April 9, 2018, accessed January 4, 2019, https://news.detik.com/berita/3961876/gerakan-2019gantipresiden-melanggar-ini-penjelasan-bawaslu.

vote, the use of technology and social media as a platform from which to reach out to such groups, prone to political apathy, was essential.[62]

As for populist elements in the 2014 election campaign, issues relating to Islam were not strongly apparent in the campaigns of either Prabowo or Jokowi, though there were some 'black campaigns' directed against the two candidates on the basis of their religion, ethnicity, and citizenship. For instance, Prabowo was rumored to be a Jordanian citizen,[63] which would make him ineligible to run for the Indonesian presidency.[64] Although illegal under Indonesian election laws, such black campaigns are expected to reoccur in the 2019 presidential election. Religious issues are strongly expected to reappear in the 2019 election campaign, and it is anticipated that both candidates will take advantage of any such movements in order to influence potential voters.[65]

Arya Fernandes[66] on the other hand, posits that religious identity or other forms of identity politics will not be prevalent in the 2019 elections because survey data suggests that most voters observe a candidate's working programs to make their decisions, as opposed to voting based on a candidate's ethnicity, race, or religion. Moreover, he argued that black campaigns, in which Jokowi was rumored to be a communist supporter[67] and which criticized his piousness, ethnic background, and political preferences, do not significantly influence voter preference for either Jokowi or Prabowo. However, despite such assertions, there remain concerns that once again racial, ethnic, and religious issues will overshadow the policies of both candidates and

---

[62] Nicolas Picard and Michelle Chang, "Will Indonesia's Online Youth Shape 2014 Elections?" The Asia Foundation, October 16, 2013, accessed February 1, 2019,
https://asiafoundation.org/2013/10/16/will-indonesias-online-youth-shape-2014-elections/.
[63] Arfianto Purbolaksono, "Kampanye Hitam Jelang Pilpres 2014 Rugikan Masyarakat," The Indonesian Institute, June 6, 2014, accessed January 3, 2019,
https://www.theindonesianinstitute.com/kampanye-hitam-jelang-pilpres-2014-rugikan-masyarakat/.
[64] On the other side, there were also rumors about Jokowi being the son of a Chinese Christian. Questioning his religious piousness as a Muslim, these rumors caused some dents on his popularity and he had to address this rumor (Mietzner, "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia").
[65] "Pilpres 2019: 'Kampanye hitam SARA masih ampuh untuk mengeksploitasi perilaku pemilih," *BBC Indonesia*, September 25, 2018, accessed January 5, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-45629345.
[66] Fernandes, "Politik Identitas dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi dan Efektivitas," 8.
[67] Accusation of him being a supporter of the former Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) has been ongoing since the previous election. Being related to the PKI or communism in general is punishable by law in Indonesia. (Ihsanudin, "Presiden: Akhir-akhir Ini Banyak Spanduk Jokowi PKI," *Kompas*, December 12, 2018, accessed December 26, 2018,
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/12/07/13292441/presiden-akhir-akhir-ini-banyak-spanduk-jokowi-pki.)

cause voters to neglect such considerations and rather vote in favor of the candidate with the most 'appropriate identity.'

As such, populist elements occurring in the 2014 election campaign are expected to reoccur in the upcoming 2019 election. Prabowo has retained his stance as a 'maverick' trying to elicit emotional reactions from the masses. He kept his anti-elite stance, even blatantly claiming that the current administration is a liar and a thief.[68] In terms of trade, he delivered a promise that Indonesia will not be importing anything from foreign countries if he is elected as the president.[69] This kind of promise signals a significant rollback from globalization, which is one of the characteristics of populism. However, the full effects of such campaigns cannot be observed until the election in April 2019.

In terms of force mobilization strategies, the similarities between Trump and Prabowo lie in both candidates lack of support from mainstream media outlets, and their view of social media as a platform integral to reaching out and connecting with society. However, there are still differences between the two. Trump does not necessarily need other social media accounts besides his own verified account to gain popularity. The 'power' of his social media strategy can be attributed to his ability to utilize his skills in self-branding through the platform. On the other hand, Prabowo still relies upon his supporters and other social media accounts to gain popularity. This is illustrated by the fact that the controversies and black campaigns surrounding the elections did not originate from his personal account nor from his personal statements, but from those of his supporters, coalition party accounts, and his own party's social media accounts. In both cases, heightened social media activity occurs particularly prior to and in the aftermath of presidential debates, which for Trump were conducted on January 17 and February 17, 2019. Similarly, terms or hashtags relating to the debates trended on Indonesian Twitter for several hours.[70]

---

[68] "Prabowo Sebut Elit Pembohong & Pencuri. Siapa yang Dimaksud?" *CNN Indonesia*, November 23, 2018, accessed January 10, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3exAD02JVJA.

[69] Jessi Carina, "Prabowo Janji, Indonesia Tak Impor Apa Pun jika Ia Jadi Presiden," *Kompas*, November 4, 2018, accessed December 30, 2018, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/11/04/14460821/prabowo-janji-indonesia-tak-impor-apa-pun-jika-ia-jadi-presiden.

[70] Agustin Setyo Wardhani, "Debat Pilpres 2019 Ramaikan Linimasa Twitter," *Liputan 6*, January 17, 2019, accessed February 21, 2019, https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/3872930/debat-pilpres-2019-ramaikan-lini-masa-twitter.

Election Outcomes: Why Trump Won the 2016 U.S. Elections While Prabowo Lost the 2014 Indonesian Elections

Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States ran contrary to popular expectations, as throughout the 2016 campaign the prevailing opinion maintained that his chances of winning the election were extremely low. It is important to understand that Trump was elected by winning a majority of the electoral votes, whilst losing the popular vote, making him the fifth U.S. president to have been elected in such a way. This was possible due to Trump's brand as a successful businessman, which he utilized to promise stability and address the fears of Americans in an era when the U.S. is considered to be a declining superpower, and when the lower-classes consider globalization a threat to their quality of life. Similarly, a further factor contributing to Trump's popularity and electoral success was his ability to brand himself as someone standing for the people. We can also note that in this election, white working class voters sided with Trump on the basis of campaign promises to renegotiate trade deals with other countries, including China, and to impose tariffs on U.S. imports from these countries in order to protect U.S. jobs.[71]

Meanwhile, Mietzner argued that in 2014 Indonesia's political climate did seem to favor Prabowo's brand of populism, but was inclined towards the pragmatic and non-ideological form of populism, evident in Jokowi's campaign narrative and background. As the 'new' democratic system had just begun to stabilize in the early 2000s, Indonesian people still preferred a democratic system to the authoritarian style favored by Prabowo. This is evidenced by surveys conducted in 2013 and 2014, which revealed Indonesians' growing levels of satisfaction with the democratic system.[72] Furthermore, some surveys indicated Indonesians' dissatisfaction with the SBY administration, which was deemed to have failed to eradicate the rampant corruption in Indonesia.[73] This view is supported by other studies positing that in order to reverse voters' antipathy toward politics, anti-corruption messages and policies should

[71] David Smith, "Democrats won the House but Trump won the Election," *The Guardian*, November 10, 2018, accessed February 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/10/donald-trump-midterm-elections-2020-democrats-republicans.

[72] Aspinall and Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call," 353.

[73] James S. Davidson. *Indonesia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

be delivered during campaigns and in the post-election period.[74] Hence, it is unlikely for voters to support any party with members involved in a corruption scandal, as was the case during SBY's term in office. Jokowi's success in 2014, achieved on the basis of his clean reputation and track record of hiring professionals based on their relevant experience rather than their political backgrounds, has also been considered a victory for moderate groups, and for democracy against elite fundementalists.

Below are two tables presenting the concurrency of the domestic political situations in the United States and Indonesia, and the populist strategies adopted by candidates Donald Trump and Prabowo in the 2014, 2016, and 2019 presidential election campaigns.

Domestic Political Setting	Election Campaign		
	Prabowo (Indonesia, 2014)	Prabowo (Indonesia, 2019)	Trump (United States, 2016)
Two-party system			X
Direct voting system	X	X	
Identity politics	X (Religious & ethnic based)	X (Religious & ethnic based)	X (Right/left-wing & class based)
Election Outcome	**Lost**	**Pending**	**Won**

Table 1. The Populist Strategies of Prabowo and Trump

[74] Sandra Hamid, "Is the Party Over for Indonesia's Political Parties?" The Asia Foundation, July 25, 2012, accessed February 1, 2019, https://asiafoundation.org/2012/07/25/is-the-party-over-for-indonesias-political-parties/.

Populist Mobilization Strategies	**Election Campaign**		
	Prabowo (Indonesia, 2014)	**Prabowo (Indonesia, 2019)**	**Trump (United States, 2016)**
Attack on current administration/harnessing voter's dissatisfaction with status quo	X	X	X
Attack on opposition/critics, & manipulation of information	X (Black campaigns - indirect)	X (Black campaigns (predicted) - indirect)	X ("Fake news", attacks on mainstream media etc. - direct)
Manipulating voters' fears & emotions	X	X	X
Anti-globalization		X (Trade protectionism)	X (Trade protectionism, anti-immigration)
Nationalistic rhetoric		X	X
Anti-elite rhetoric/self-branding as 'one of the people'	X (Maverick, anti-MNC)	X (Maverick, anti-MNC)	X (Simple language, businessman)
Lack of mainstream media support	X	X	X
Use of social media as a campaign tool		X (Indirect)	X (Direct)
Election Outcome	**Lost**	**Pending**	**Won**

Table 1. The Populist Strategies of Prabowo and Trump

Conclusion

Democracy cannot be upheld when society begins to disregard or suppress certain ideologies. Despite divergences in the types of populist leaders emerging in different regions, we can see that in the past decade, the more successful populist leaders are those who have understood the potential of harnessing democracy for their cause. From the case studies above, we can see that despite differences between the two presidential candidates, whether this be differences in their ideologies, the people they stand for, or their strategies, both embodied a potential threat to the practice of democracy by using democratic pretensions to deliver populist rhetoric. In Prabowo's case, this threat was manifest in his tendency to support extreme and radical organisations that favoured authoritarian regimes, whereas in Trump's case, it is demonstrated through his attempts to delegitimize the media and those criticizing his regime by labeling such outlets as 'fake news.'

The decline of democracy can be observed not only through the actions of populist leaders theselves, but also by the extent to which citizens can be misled by false information, be emotionally manipulated by candidates to support a certain cause, and be inclined to cast their votes on the basis of a candidates perceived identity rather than the values or policies they represent. This shows that information is not spread equally. Moereover, citizens appear to have little appreciation for how their individual voting choices may affect a country's democratic system. They may not even consider the loss of democracy as a danger to be prevented. Finally, due to the limitations of this research, we suggest future research conducts further in-depth studies into the varying forms of populism around the globe in order to shed greater light on steps that must be taken to uphold democracy in the face of the global trend towards populism and protectionism.

Bibliography

Ali-Fauzi, Ihsan. "Nationalism and Islamic Populism in Indonesia." Heinrich Boll
        Stiftung Southeast Asia. May 16, 2018. Accessed December 15, 2018.
        https://th.boell.org/en/2018/05/16/nationalism-and-islamic-populism-indonesia.

Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner. "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's
        Close Call." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50, no. 3 (2014): 347-369.

Bhat, Prashanth. "Populism's Global Media Strategy." *Fair Observer*. January 19, 2017.
        Accessed January 7, 2019.
        https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/populism-media-donald-trump-
        culture-news-63421/.

Bonikowski, Bart. "Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United
        States." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2016): 9-24.

Brennan, Jason. "Opinion: The Electoral College is anti-democratic – and that's a good
        thing." Market Watch. November 8, 2016. Accessed February 5, 2019.
        https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-electoral-college-is-anti-democraticand-
        thats-a-good-thing-2016-09-12.

Carina, Jessi. "Prabowo Janji, Indonesia Tak Impor Apa Pun jika Ia Jadi Presiden."
        Kompas. November 4, 2018. Accessed December 30, 2018.
        https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/11/04/14460821/prabowo-janji-indonesia-
        tak-impor-apa-pun-jika-ia-jadi-presiden.

Chang, Andrew. "U.S. Election System vs. Rest of World." ABC News. Accessed
        February 10, 2019. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82153&page=1.

Cox, Michael. "Understanding the Global Rise of Populism." LSE Ideas. February 2018.
        Accessed December 26, 2018.
        http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Understanding-
        Global-Rise-of-Populism.pdf.

Davidson, James S. *Indonesia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Detlef, Jahn, Nils Dupont, and Martin Rachuj. "Left-Right Party Ideologies in 36

Countries." Greifswald Comparative Politics Working Paper 11, January 2018. Accessed January 3, 2019. http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/gcp/GCP-11-2018.pdf.

EbyHara, Abubakar. "Populism in Indonesia and its Threats to Democracy." Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017). January 2018. doi: 10.2991/icsps-17.2018.23.

Election Guide. "Republic of Indonesia." Accessed February 1, 2019. http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/102/.

Fernandes, Arya. "Politik Identitas dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi dan Efektivitas." *CSIS Election Series* 1 (2018): 1-19.

Frazee, Gretchen. "4 myths about how immigrants affect the U.S. economy." Public Broadcasting Service. November 2, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-economy.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The Rise of Populist Nationalism." Credit Suisse. January 23, 2018. Accessed February 1, 2018. https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-and-expertise/francis-fukuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801.html.

Hamid, Sandra. "Is the Party Over for Indonesia's Political Parties?" The Asia Foundation. July 25, 2012. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://asiafoundation.org/2012/07/25/is-the-party-over-for-indonesias-political-parties/.

Hamid, Sandra. "Jokowi's Party Takes Lead in Indonesia's Elections, But Steep Road Ahead." The Asia Foundation. April 9, 2014. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://asiafoundation.org/2014/04/09/jokowis-party-takes-lead-in-indonesias-elections-but-steep-road-ahead/.

Hendriks, Liz. "Trump's logic: Rhetoric in the 2016 US elections." *Bachelor thesis*. Tilburg University. 2018. Accessed February 24, 2019. http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=146214.

Hunston, Susan. "Donald Trump and the language of populism." *University of Birmingham*. September 2017. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/donald-trump-language-of-populism.aspx.

Ihsanudin. "Presiden: Akhir-akhir Ini Banyak Spanduk Jokowi PKI." *Kompas*. December 12, 2018. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/12/07/13292441/presiden-akhir-akhir-ini-banyak-spanduk-jokowi-pki.

Kenny, Paul D. *Populism in Southeast Asia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 1-77.

Khan Academy. "The Populist." Accessed January 3, 2019. https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/the-gilded-age/gilded-age/a/the-populists.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Southeast Asia's Populism Is Different but Also Dangerous." Council on Foreign Relations. November 1, 2018. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/article/southeast-asias-populism-different-also-dangerous.

Liddle, R. William and Saiful Mujani. "Leadership, Party, and Religion, Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia." *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 7 (2007): 832-857.

Malik, Asmiati and Scott Edwards. "From 212 to 812: Copy and Paste Populism in Indonesia and Malaysia?" *The Diplomat*. December 18, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/from-212-to-812-copy-and-paste-populism-in-indonesia-and-malaysia/.

Mavrozacharakis, Emmanuel. "Populism and Democracy: An Ambiguous Relationship." *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*. October 23, 2018. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/Home/eqpam_vol7no4-oct2018-_mavrozacharakis.

Mietzner, Marcus. "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia." East-West Center. 2015. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps072.pdf?file=1&type=node&id =35018.

Muzayyin, Arif Huluwan. "Dugaan Intimidasi Massa #2019GantiPresiden Dicap Warisan Orba." *CNN Indonesia*. April 30, 2018. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180430092357-20-294591/dugaan-intimidasi-massa-2019gantipresiden-dicap-warisan-orba.

Nabbs-Keller, Greta. "Indonesia: populism and politicisation of Islam." *The Interpreter*. October 26, 2018. Accessed December 27, 2018. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-populism-and-politicisation-islam.

Naim, Moises. "How to Be a Populist." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. April 21, 2017. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/21/how-to-be-populist-pub-68751.

Novianto, Raka Dwi. "Habib Rizieq Dukung Setelah Prabowo-Sandi Teken Pakta Integritas." *Nasional Sindo News*. September 16, 2018. Accessed January 3, 2019. https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1338617/12/habib-rizieq-dukung-setelah-prabowo-sandi-teken-pakta-integritas-1537076942.

Papdemetriou, Demetrios G., Kate Hooper, and Meghan Benton. "In Search of a New Equilibrium: Immigration Policymaking in the Newest Era of Nativist Populism." Transatlantic Council on Migration. November 2018. Accessed January 6, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/.../TCM-NativistPopulism_Final.pdf.

Pearce, Joel. "A Politics of the People: Comparing the Use of Populist Discourse in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *Undergraduate Political Review* 1 (2018): 22-57. doi: 10.21953/lse.nqq3eycr36ij.

Picard, Nicolas and Michelle Chang. "Will Indonesia's Online Youth Shape 2014 Elections?" The Asia Foundation. October 16, 2013. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://asiafoundation.org/2013/10/16/will-indonesias-online-youth-shape-2014-elections/.

"Pilpres 2019: Kampanye hitam SARA masih ampuh untuk mengeksploitasi perilaku pemilih." *BBC Indonesia*. September 25, 2018. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-45629345.

"Prabowo Sebut Elit Pembohong & Pencuri. Siapa yang Dimaksud?" *CNN Indonesia*. November 23, 2018. Accessed January 10, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3exAD02JVJA.

Prasetyawan, Wahyu. "Populism or Identity Politics: Explaining Electoral Politics in

Indonesia." Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. November 2017. Accessed December 10, 2018. https://kyotoreview.org/yav/populism-identity-electoral-politics-indonesia/.

Purbolaksono, Arfianto. "Kampanye Hitam Jelang Pilpres 2014 Rugikan Masyarakat." The Indonesian Institute. June 6, 2014. Accessed January 3, 2019. https://www.theindonesianinstitute.com/kampanye-hitam-jelang-pilpres-2014-rugikan-masyarakat/.

Putra, Putu Merta Surya. "Gaya kampanye contek Trump, Prabowo diingatkan soal retorika anti asing." *Merdeka*. October 12, 2018. Accessed January 2, 2019. https://www.merdeka.com/politik/gaya-kampanye-contek-trump-prabowo-diingatkan-soal-retorika-anti-asing.html.

Putri, Parastiti Kharisma. "Gerakan #2019GantiPresiden Melanggar? Ini Penjelasan Bawaslu." *Detik News*. April 9, 2018. Accessed January 4, 2019. https://news.detik.com/berita/3961876/gerakan-2019gantipresiden-melanggar-ini-penjelasan-bawaslu.

Quigley, Jared. "An Unlikely Populist: Donald Trump and the Rhetoric of Elite and Minority Resentment." *Honors Scholar Theses*. University of Connecticut. 2018. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1586?context=srhonors_theses.

Rahadian, Lalu. "Retorika Prabowo, Slogan Kampanye Trump, dan Tuduhan Rasisme." *Tirto Indonesia*. October 12, 2018. Accessed December 30, 2018. https://tirto.id/retorika-prabowo-slogan-kampanye-trump-dan-tuduhan-rasisme-c6tt.

Ronald. "Polisi Periksa Korban Dugaan Intimidasi Kelompok 2019 Ganti Presiden." *Liputan 6*. May 7, 2018. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3504999/polisi-periksa-korban-dugaan-intimidasi-kelompok-2019-ganti-presiden.

Smith, David. "Democrats won the House but Trump won the Election." *The Guardian*. November 10, 2018. Accessed February 2, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/10/donald-trump-midterm-elections-2020-democrats-republicans.

Sohuturon, Martahan. "Polri: Deklarasi #2019GantiPresiden Ancam Persatuan Bangsa." *CNN Indonesia*. August 27, 2018. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180827134942-20-325193/polri-deklarasi-2019gantipresiden-ancam-persatuan-bangsa.

Subramanian, Arvind and Martin Kessler. "The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future." Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series 13-6. July 2013. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/wp/wp13-6.pdf.

Sunstein, Cass. "Now on Trump's hit list: freedom of speech." *Timesunion*. August 29, 2018. Accessed January 8, 2019. https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Now-on-Trump-s-hit-list-freedom-of-speech-13192523.php.

Thornley, Andrew. "Nine Takeaways from the Legislative Elections." The Asia Foundation. April 16, 2014. Accessed February 1, 2019. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IndonesiaElections.pdf.

"US Journo's 2001 'Off the Record' Prabowo Interview Details Indonesia 'Not Ready for Democracy.'" *Jakarta Globe*. June 26, 2014. Accessed January 2, 2019. https://jakartaglobe.id/news/us-journos-2001-record-prabowo-interview-details-indonesia-ready-democracy/.

Van Zyl-Hermann, Danelle. "Make Afrikaners great again! National populism,

democracy and the new white minority politics in post-apartheid South Africa." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41, no.15 (2018): 2673-2692.

Vittorio, Massimo. "Can Populism Be an Ally of Democracy?" *Online International Journal of Philosophy* XII, no. 24 (2017): 124-141. doi: 10.7413/18281567116.

Wardhani, Agustin Setyo. "Debat Pilpres 2019 Ramaikan Linimasa Twitter." *Liputan 6*. January 17, 2019. Accessed February 21, 2019. https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/3872930/debat-pilpres-2019-ramaikan-lini-masa-twitter.

Wimberly, Cory. "Trump, Propaganda, and the Politics of Ressentiment." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 32, no. 1 (2018): 179-199. doi: 10.5325/jspecphil.32.1.0179.

Wiwoho, Bimo. "Deklarasi #2019GantiPresiden Diklaim Bukan Gerakan Politik." *CNN Indonesia*. May 3, 2018. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180503182913-20-295516/deklarasi-2019gantipresiden-diklaim-bukan-gerakan-politik.